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STATE OF UTAH 
stsn-e* 
BRENDA *4AJ6k WKBER, 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of ROBERT W. 
MAJOR, JR. , Deceased, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO. , INC., a 
Utah corporation, et al. , 
Defendants, 
and 
SNYDERVILLE WEST, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 890599-CA 
District Court 
No. 7325 
MOTION TO DISREGARD 
OR STRIKE IN PART THE 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant/Respondent Snyderville West (hereinafter, 
"Snyderville West"), by and through its counsel, hereby moves 
this Court for an Order to Disregard or Strike in Part the Reply 
Brief of Appellant dated February 23, 1990, pursuant to Rule 
24(k) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, or otherwise for 
an Order to Disregard or Strike part of said Reply Brief, for the 
following three reasons: 
1. Plaintiff's argument of "constructive notice" has not 
previously been raised in this case, and therefore Plaintiff is 
not entitled to have its "constructive notice" argument 
considered on appeal. 
2. The "constructive notice" statute, U. C. A. §78-40.2, 
applies only to purchasers subsequent to the recording of a Lis 
Pendens, and Snyderville West purchased the subject real 
property five years prior to the recording of the Lis Pendens.; 
and 
In support of its Motion, Plaintiff has filed herewith its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities dated March 12, 1990. 
DATED this / ^ day of March, 1990. 
COHNE, RAPPAPOBT & SEGAL, P. C. 
Ra. chard/Ar Ra£papor£ / 
William B. WrayC Jp. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was hand-delivered this 12- day of March/ 1990/ to the 
following: 
Robert F, Orton 
Virginia Curtis Lee 
MARSDEN/ ORTON# CAHOON & GOTTFRBDSON 
68 South Main Street 
Fifth Floor /j 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 8410;* 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of ROBERT W. 
MAJOR, JR. , Deceased, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO. , INC. , a 
Utah corporation, et al. , 
Defendants, 
and 
SNYDERVILLE WEST, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 890599-CA 
District Court 
No. 7325 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT/ 
RESPONDENT SNYDERVILLE 
WEST'S MOTION TO DISREGARD 
OR STRIKE REPLY BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff/Appellant Brenda Major Weber (hereinafter, 
"Plaintiff") has filed her Reply Brief of Appellant dated 
February 23, 1990 in this case. As required by Rule 24(c) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the Reply Brief is to be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing 
Brief, being the Brief of Respondent dated February 24, 1990 as 
filed by Snyderville West. 
As set forth more fully below, Snyderville West contends 
that the Reply Brief of Appellant should be disregarded or 
stricken in part because the major part of Plaintiff's Reply 
Brief deals with the issue of constructive notice which (a) was 
not raised at the trial level, (b) was not raised in Respondent' s 
Brief, and (c) which is irrelevant. 
Plaintiff's argument of "constructive notice" has not 
previously been raised in this case before the trial court as 
the prior briefs before this court, and therefore Plaintiff is 
not entitled to have its "constructive notice" argument 
considered on appeal. 
Nor was the "constructive notice" argument raised in 
Respondent's Brief and therefore pursuant to Rule 24(c) is not a 
matter which should now be raised. 
The "constructive notice" statute (§78-40.2, U. C. A. ) 
applies only to purchasers subsequent to the recording of a Lis 
Pendens, and Snyderville West purchased the subject real property 
five years prior to the recording of the Lis Pendens. 
I 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" ARGUMENT WAS NOT 
RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT NOR RAISED IN PRIOR BRIEFS 
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, PLAINTIFF' S ARGUMENT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL AND THEREFORE THAT 
PORTION OF PLAINTIFF' S REPLY BRIEF DEALING WITH 
"CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN. 
Issues or other matters not raised in the pleadings nor 
otherwise put in issue at the trial court level may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal. Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 
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P. 2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989); James v. Preston, 746 P. 2d 799, 
801 (Utah App. 1987). 
As stated by the court in the James case, 
A matter is sufficiently raised if it 
has been submitted to the trial court and 
the trial court has had the opportunity 
to make findings of fact or law, 
(Citation omitted). "Theories or issues 
which are not apparent or reasonably 
discernable from the pleadings, 
affidavits and exhibits will not be 
considered. " Id. at 801. 
There must be more than mere mention of or allusion to 
the theory or matter in the record of proceedings before the 
trial court. As stated by the Court of Appeals in the James 
case: 
For an issue to be sufficiently raised, 
even if indirectly, it must at least be 
raised to a level of consciousness such 
that the trial judge can consider it. 
Id. , at 802. 
Snyderville West' s examination of the record of memoranda 
and arguments presented to the trial court below has failed to 
disclose any reference to the "constructive notice" argument now 
raised by the Plaintiff for the first time in Plaintiff's Reply 
Brief. Further, there was no mention of this issue and argument 
in Plaintiff s Brief of Appellant. Snyderville West did not 
raise or discuss the question of "constructive notice" in its 
Brief of Respondent. Therefore, this new issue is inappropriate 
pursuant to Rule 24(c) R. Utah Ct. App. Section 78-40-2 of Utah 
Code Annotated, upon which Plaintiff principally relies in her 
Reply Brief, was not cited to or referred to in any previous 
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memoranda or arguments of Plaintiff or of Snyderville West. The 
matter of "constructive notice" through recordation of the Lis 
Pendens has simply not been an issue in this case. 
It is true that Plaintiff has made several references in 
her Memoranda, both at the trial court level and before this 
court, concerning the existence of the Lis Pendens, for instance 
in the several Statements of Facts as cited by Plaintiff, and on 
page forty-nine of Plaintiff's Brief of Appellant (". . .while 
the Lis Pendens was of record."). But these fleeting and benign 
references to a document incontrovertibly of record in the Summit 
County Recorder' s Office did not constitute by any stretch of the 
imagination the equivalent of raising as an argument or issue the 
matter of "constructive notice" and Section 78-40-2. The matter 
clearly was sufficiently not raised, and therefore should not be 
considered by the Court of Appeals. James v. Preston, Id. at 
801. 
II 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" ARGUMENT IS 
ERRONEOUS AND IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE, AND THEREFORE 
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN BY THIS COURT. 
S n y d e r v i l l e West b e l i e v e s t h a t P l a i n t i f f s R e p l y B r i e f 
s e t s f o r t h an e r r o n e o u s and i r r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g 
" c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e , " w h i c h argument u n d e r Utah l a w s i m p l y d o e s 
n o t p r o p e r l y a p p l y t o t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , and t h a t t h e r e f o r e 
P l a i n t i f f s R e p l y B r i e f s h o u l d b e d i s r e g a r d e d o r s t r i c k e n 
p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 24 ( k ) , R. Utah Ct. App. 
The c e n t r a l t h r u s t o f P l a i n t i f f s a r g u m e n t as s e t f o r t h i n 
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her Reply Brief is that Snyderville West had "constructive 
notice" on the basis of §78-40-2, U. C.A. , by reason of recording 
of a Lis Pendens in the Summit County Recorder' s Office on April 
11, 1983 (Reply Brief, at page 3, paragraph 9), and that 
therefore (somehow) Snyderville West is bound by the January 17, 
1986 judgment. See, e.g., Plaintiff's "Conclusion" as set forth 
in her Reply Brief, at 16-18. 
But Plaintiff has apparently misunderstood the 
significance and effect of this statute. Snyderville West was 
not a subsequent purchaser after the Lis Pendens was recorded, 
but in fact purchased its interest by Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (and placed a notice thereof of record) in 1978, five 
years before the Lis Pendens was recorded. 
Because Snyderville West had purchased the property prior 
to the recording of the Lis Pendens, the recording of the Lis 
Pendens had no affect whatsoever, and gave no constructive 
notice whatsoever, to Snyderville West. Had Snyderville West 
purchased its interest by contract subsequent to April 11, 1983, 
then pursuant to Section 78-40-2, Snyderville West would be 
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, 
as described in the statute. This is consistent with the purpose 
of the recording statutes and Utah's "Race/Notice" system of 
land title records, which imparts to subsequent purchasers 
knowledge of that which is of record prior to their making their 
purchase. But there is nothing whatsoever in the said statute 
with respect to imparting constructive notice to one who 
- 5 -
purchased property pursuant to a real estate contract prior to 
the recording of the Lis Pendens. As stated in said statute: 
"from the time of filing such notice for 
record only shall a purchaser or 
encumbrancer of the property affected 
thereby be deemed to have constructive 
notice. . . . M (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff correctly, but irrelevantly, notes that case law 
under the "doctrine of Lis Pendens" supports the statutory 
concept of constructive notice to persons subsequently taking an 
interest in that property. See e. g. , Blodaett v. Zions First 
National Bank, 752 P.2d. 901 (Utah App. 1988), as referred to 
and quoted in Plaintiff s Reply Brief, at 7-8. 
But under Utah law Snyderville West purchased its real 
property interest in 1978 when it entered into its Uniform Real 
Estate Contract with the seller and commenced making payments 
under the contract. Plaintiff in her Reply Brief attempts to 
get around the 1978 contract purchase of the property by 
Snyderville West by contending, in effect, that Snyderville West 
took its interest in the subject seven acres not in 1978, but in 
1983 when it received its Warranty Deed from Joseph Krofcheck, 
the successor to the 1978 contract seller, in fulfillment of the 
terms of the real estate contract. 
Under Utah law, under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion, equitable title and the right of ownership of the 
property passed upon execution of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract in 1978, and all that the seller thereafter held was a 
personalty interest in the right to receive the contract proceeds 
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according to the terms of the contract, coupled with the 
obligation upon completion of the contract to deliver the deed 
confirming title. For that reason, Plaintiff is incorrect in her 
assertion in the paragraph at the bottom of page thirteen, and 
elsewhere, in Plaintiff's Reply Brief that "Snyderville West had 
only an equitable interest in the seven acres and did not qualify 
as a bona fide purchaser who could cut off any earlier legal or 
equitable interest, " 
The doctrine of equitable conversion as applied to the 
purchase and sale of real property under contract is well 
established in Utah law. For instance, in Lach v. Deseret Bank, 
746 P. 2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), the court stated as follows: 
The doctrine of equitable conversion 
provides that "an enforceable executory 
contract of sale [upon which an action 
for specific performance could be 
brought] has the effect of converting the 
interest of the vendor of real property 
to personalty. " Willson v. State Tax 
Commission, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P. 2d 
1298, 1300 (1972) (Quoting All red v. 
Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P. 2d 791, 792 
(1964)). The purchaser acquires the 
equitable interest in the property at 
the moment the contract is created and is 
thereafter treated as the owner of the 
land. Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial 
District Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P. 2d 
739, 741 (1973). Id., at 805. 
As stated by the court: 
When this agreement was executed, Lach 
became the equitable owner of the 
property and the judgment debtors, the 
Dewsnups, held only a personalty interest 
in the property. The Bank' s docketing of 
a judgment against the Dewsnups on 
December 12, 1980 [after the execution of 
the earnest money agreement] did not 
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create a judgment lien against the 
property because the Dewsnups did not 
then have a real property interest to 
which the lien could attach. Under the 
uncontroverted facts, and as a matter of 
law, Lach owns the property free from any 
judgment lien in favor of the Bank . .. 
Id. , at 805-806. 
See also, e.g., Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P. 2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). 
The Lach case and the principle of equitable conversion 
discussed and applied therein and in numerous other Utah cases 
have direct applicability to the present case. When Snyderville 
West purchased the subject seven acres in 1978, it became the 
equitable owner of the property, and the seller thereafter, 
including his successor Joseph Krofcheck, did not have a real 
property interest which any subsequent filings such as a Lis 
Pendens could attach. The deliverance of the deed from 
Krofcheck to Snyderville West in 1983 merely constituted 
satisfaction of the obligation under the contract to convey legal 
title once the contract was fully paid off, and there was no 
delivery of a real property interest which the Lis Pendens could 
have affected. 
CONCLUSION 
For not one but three separate reasons, any one of which 
is sufficient, Plaintiff s Reply Brief should be disregarded or 
stricken by this court. 
First, as required by Rule 24(c), R. Utah Ct. App. , reply 
briefs must be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
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the opposing brief. But in this instance Plaintiff s Reply Brief 
does not address or purport to answer any new matter set forth in 
Snyderville West' s Brief of Respondent, but instead is 
principally dedicated to arguing a wholly new issue of 
" constructive notice". 
Second, Rule 24(k), R. Utah Ct. App. , requires that all 
briefs must be free from irrelevant and immaterial matters. But 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief is concerned principally with Plaintiff's 
new argument concerning "constructive notice," which is a 
spurious and irrelevant argument, immaterial to the outcome of 
this case, since under the doctrine of equitable conversion 
Snyderville West acquired its real property interest in 1978, 
five years prior to the recording of the Lis Pendens, rather than 
subsequent to the recording of the Lis Pendens, the situation 
with which Section 78-40-2 is solely concerned. Plaintiff s 
reliance on the cited statute and the "doctrine of Lis Pendens" 
is simply not applicable in this case. 
Third, Plaintiff's "constructive notice" argument and 
reliance on Section 78-40-2 was not raised prior, either at the 
trial court level or in the prior briefs or arguments before 
this court. Therefore, Plaintiff s argument is simply not 
entitled to be considered on appeal. For that reason, that 
portion (or all) of Plaintiff's Reply Brief dealing with 
"constructive notice" should be disregarded or stricken. 
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DATED this (^ day of March, 1990. 
COHNE, RAPPAPCJRJT & SEGAL, P. C 
Rrthard yA.' Rat5ps&>o:i 
William B. Wi4y^ j£ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Snyderville West 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was hand-delivered this i+~^ day of March, 1990, to 
the following: 
Robert F. Orton 
Virginia Curtis Lee 
MARSEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 South Main Street 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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